2d 65 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082 n. 12, 49 L. Ed. One of the claims most strongly urged by the plaintiff was that the officer had "a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to . The proposition that an officer who beats John Doe may not use self-defense to justify killing Doe, who later attacks him, rests on the idea that because the officer's wrongful acts caused the attack, he cannot take advantage of his fear of retaliation to defend against liability. Joyce Ailes heard Dino banging against the house; she saw him and opened the door. at 1276, n. 8. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. Hyde v. Bowman et al Filing 82 ORDER ADOPTING the 78 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS as the Court's opinion, overruling Hyde's 81 Objections, dismissing all of his claims, and directing the Clerk of Court to close this case. Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of self-defense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". Cited 12622 times, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983) | Signed by District Judge R. Stan Baker on 01/06/2023. He also said, in substance, "Go ahead and shoot. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. According to Monell V. Department of Social Services Supreme Court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when a_of the entity causes_ . Circumstances can alter cases. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. So a court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer's original reports or statements and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer's testimony could reasonably be rejected at a trial. Perhaps we ought not to consider this theory since it was not pled, but it is of no use to Plakas in any event. He tried to avoid violence. 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. My life isn't worth anything." Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant Yet we rejected the proposition "that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect." Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. Plakas refused medical treatment and signed a written waiver of treatment. A training program would be created under the bill that would cover racial bias and duty to intervene, and the measure would require that police officers use deadly force only as a last resort and use de-escalation techniques. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. 1994), in which he states: . Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. Plakas was turned on his back. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . 1989). In this record, there is expert opinion that Drinski might have been better trained to negotiate with Plakas and that he may have said one thing to Plakas that he ought not to have said, i.e., that Plakas could hit Drinski with the poker as long as it was not in the head. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. Joyce and Rachel helped him. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. French v. State, 273 Ind. * The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. H91-365. Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. Reconsideration will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the future before it occurred. 1988) (en banc). Plakas V. Drinski - Ebook written by . We always judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. ZAGEL, District Judge. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. Cited 105 times, 774 F.2d 1495 (1985) | In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. . The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED. King, Koby, Cain and Trooper Lucien Mark Perras of the Indiana State Police responded, as did Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Drinski. defendant cites Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. right or left of "armed robbery. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. His theme was that there were people, including his girlfriend at the house, who cared about Plakas and that nobody needs to get hurt. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. Plakas's administrator claimed that the self-defense story was full of holes and that, even if it were not, Drinski and the county which employed him had a constitutional obligation to do more to preserve his life than they did. Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. Civ. You're all set! Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. 1988) (en banc) . This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. Again, he struck her. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. 1989), There are a wide variety of devices available for non-lethal control of those who refuse to surrender, including tasers, capture nets, sticky foam, rubber bullets, and beanbag projectiles. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. He raised or cocked the poker but did not swing it. In Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.1994), Plakas's administrator argued that the defendant officer, instead of shooting Plakas, should have used a non-lethal cannister of CS Gas he carried on his belt, or used a canine unit on the scene to take Plakas down, or tried to isolate him while keeping a safe distance. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. In the case of Plakas v. Drinski, the Federal district court in Indiana decided the use of a less lethal alternative was not required when the use of deadly force by police was justified. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. Koby reported the escape and called for help. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Vinyard v. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. Cain left. Plakas's administrator claimed that the self-defense story was full of holes and that, even if it were not, Drinski and the county which employed him had a constitutional obligation to do more to preserve his life than they did. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Get free summaries of new Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! It is significant he never yelled about a beating. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. 1994) case opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division. She did not have her night stick. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. There are a wide variety of devices available for nonlethal control of those who refuse to surrender, including tasers, capture nets, sticky foam, rubber bullets, and beanbag projectiles. It is from that point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. 1994)). Plakas was turned on his back. The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. 2d 1 (1985). We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. He swore Koby would not touch him. Even if Koby did beat Plakas, Koby was not at the scene of Plakas's demise. Plakas, however, merely mentions this testimony to show that Drinski was badly trained. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F. 3d 1143 (7th Cir. Drinski was faced with a man who had, minutes before, attacked a police officer with a dangerous weapon, had refused several entreaties to disarm, had told the officer that one of the two would die that night, and then had moved toward the officer while raising his weapon to strike. He picked one of them up, a 2-3 foot poker with a hook on its end. He moaned and said, "I'm dying." Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause, and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. 635 (1987) , the Supreme Court held that when an officer of the la w (in this case, an FBI officer) conducts a search which violates the Fourth Amendment , that officer is entitled to qualified immunit y if the officer proves that a reasonable officer could ha ve believed that the search They noticed that his clothes were wet. Joyce and Rachel helped him. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. Our historical emphasis on the shortness of the legally relevant time period is not accidental. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. 4. Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. She had no idea if other officers would arrive. Circuit court decisions further interpret U.S. Supreme Court decisions: 7th Circuit -Plakas v. Drinski (1994) -Decided that there is no So we carve up the incident into segments and judge each on its own terms to see if the officer was reasonable at each stage. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. 1992). Cain examined Plakas's head and found nothing that required medical treatment. Cain and some officers went to the house. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. 1994), and Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. Hyde v. Bowman et al. Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. Toggle navigation . armed robbery w/5 gun, "gun" occurs to Cited 43 times, 855 F.2d 1271 (1988) | He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him.&gENDFN>. United States Court of Appeals . Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. Plakas turned and faced them. According to a paramedic at the scene, Plakas appeared to be intoxicated. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. Plakas was calm until he saw Cain and Koby. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. The clearing was small, but Plakas and the officers were ten feet apart. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. The record before us leaves only room for speculation about some circumstances. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1697, 85 L. Ed. There is no contention that this "invitation" immediately preceded the shooting or caused Plakas to charge Drinski. Justia. He also told Plakas to drop the weapon and get down on the ground. There can be reasonable debates about whether the Constitution also enacts a code of criminal procedure, but we think it is clear that the Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list.7 We decline to use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.8. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. No. She alleges that her son was armed with only a fireplace poker and posed no serious threat to the safety of Drinski or others. Cited 1106 times, Perkovic v. Marine City Police Officer Heaslip, LUNA-DIAZ et al v. HACKENSACK POLICE DEPARTMENT et al, Romero v. Board of County Commissioners of, ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY et al v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al, Estate of Andre Alexander Gree v. City of Indianapolis, Estate of Jason Ike Pero, by Personal Representative Holly Gauthier v. County of Ashland et al, Matthew King v. Hendricks County Commissioner, Jensen, Tristan v. Budreau, Anthony et al, United States of America v. City of Albuquerque, Nelson v. Board of County Commissioners of the Bernalillo County et al, Bradley v. Rochester Police Department et al, KING v. HENDRICKS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al, Jonas v. Board of Commissioners of Luna County. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Northern District. letters, 963 F.2d 952 (1992) | App. et al Filing 89 MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable John F. Grady on 12/29/2011. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. Cain knew there was an ambulance at that site and that Plakas could be examined more carefully there. 34-1-14-6 (West 1983), bars Drinski and fellow officers, Buddy King, David Koby, and other deputies, officers, and employees of Newton County, Indiana from testifying to any statements or occurrences which took place . In Tom v. Voida we were not addressing Officer Voida's decision to shoot; we were addressing her decision to draw her firearm and, even there, we spoke of a decision process that was quick and simple. The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor.
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